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Why are courts generally reluctant to vindicate the claims of aliens
seeking to come to or remain in a foreign country? What makes immi-
gration unique as a subject for judicial intervention in terms of deference
to the prerogatives of the other branches of government, to the detriment
of individual rights? These questions, which have long puzzled practi-
tioners, are addressed by Professor Legomsky in Immigration and the
Judiciary. His method is to examine and compare judicial review of im-
migration cases in the United Kingdom and the United States.
Legomsky finds a nearly uniform reluctance on the part of these two
judiciaries to uphold the claims of aliens:
Generally, the results in the immigration cases have been distinctively con-
servative, a term used here to mean favouring the government over the im-
migrant on issues that could reasonably have been decided either way. In
addition, both the results and ordinarily the rhetoric illustrate the courts'
own perceptions that their role requires exceptional deference to the gov-
ernmental entities whose decisions are being reviewed.2
This conclusion is based on Legomsky's meticulous and scholarly exami-
nation of the availability and scope of judicial review in the United King-
dom and the United States, including review of findings of fact,
administrative rules, and exercises of discretion, as well as principles of
statutory interpretation and application of required procedural safe-
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guards in administrative determinations. 3 The jurisprudence of the Im-
migration Appeal Tribunal and the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), the highest administrative review fora for immigration cases in
Britain and America, respectively, is also specifically discussed.
4
The techniques of judicial abdication chronicled in Immigration and
the Judiciary are varied. Under certain circumstances, the courts decline
review altogether. In the United Kingdom, this approach is exemplified
by the nonreviewable character of the royal prerogative, a residual dis-
cretionary determination not considered susceptible to judicial review
with reference to articulable statutory standards. 5 In the United States,
the doctrine of consular nonreviewability-the principle that precludes
judicial review of adverse visa decisions made abroad by consular of-
ficers-provides another example. 6 Legomsky presses beyond mere de-
scription. After questioning the logic in the origins of consular
nonreviewability, he criticizes the doctrine as fundamentally incompati-
ble with the presumption of reviewability under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.
7
Yet another illustration of abdication is the so called "plenary power"
doctrine, which insulates from review under the Constitution the criteria
and procedures for the exclusion and deportation of aliens from the
United States. 8 The plenary power doctrine provides an even more ex-
treme example of the tyranny of unprincipled precedent. Legomsky at-
tributes this categorical preclusion to an accretion of precedent unrelated
to the origins of the doctrine and without ascertainable foundation in
logic or policy.9 The doctrine was derived from early cases dealing with
the relationship of the federal and the state governments concerning im-
migration. In a leap of logic, it was extended to provide a barrier to
judicial review against the assertion of individual rights of aliens. 10 Even
though periodically identified as a jurisprudential curiosity, the doctrine
has remained immune from overruling. As Justice Frankfurter explained
over thirty years ago,
3. Pp. 12-106, 143-76.
4. Pp. 111-24, 155-70, 282-90.
5. Pp. 87-92; but cf pp. 92-93 (modem British cases eroding the unreviewability of prerog-
ative acts).
6. Pp. 145-51.
7. Pp. 177-222. The only incursion into this broad preclusion is the application of proce-
dural due process to aliens who have entered the United States and who are subject to deporta-
tion proceedings. See The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. United States), 189 U.S. 86
(1903).
8. Pp. 147-51. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1982).
9. Pp. 217-19.
10. Id. (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Head Money Cases, 112
U.S. 580 (1884); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)).
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[M]uch could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the
Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore rec-
ognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of
aliens....
But the slate is not clean .... [T]hat the formulation of these policies is
entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in
the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
government. "1
The weight of precedent seems to have overwhelmed reason.
Even where review is undertaken, the conservative approach of the
courts is reflected in the manipulation of the applicable standards of re-
view. Issues presented may be characterized as questions of "fact" or
"discretion" for which a diminished level of review is available. 12 In
those instances where plausible issues are presented for review, especially
under diminished standards, the results are generally antagonistic to the
interests of the individual alien. 13
But the restrictive approach is not monolithic. Legomsky identifies a
departure from judicial abdication in the relatively assertive approach
taken by United States courts on issues of statutory interpretation-a
subject on which the courts are presumed to be experts. 14 He looks spe-
cifically to the development of the ameliorative Fleuti doctrine, which is
designed to protect returning aliens from forfeitures of status occasioned
by brief, casual, and innocent departures from the country, 15 as well as to
the extension of discretionary relief to alien criminals who had never left
the United States, despite statutory language which purports to restrict
the relief to returning residents who have gone abroad. 16 Statutory pro-
visions are interpreted broadly and purposively in order to sustain claims
by aliens. But note a recent interruption in this progressive development
in the United States Supreme Court's 1984 decision in the Phinpathya
case,17 which interpreted statutory language literally in determining that
an alien had not satisfied the "continuous physical presence" require-
ment for suspension of deportation, 8 depriving her of the benefit of the
Fleuti doctrine. 19 Phinpathya, however, might be explained as an
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informed judicial response to the perceived need to enhance immigration
control at a time prior to the enactment of legislation designed to curb
undocumented migration.20
Legomsky examines several possible theories to explain the conserva-
tism of the courts.21 Is it due to the presence of weighty governmental
interests and political questions, such as national security or foreign pol-
icy? Is it due to the absence of significant individual interests, on the part
of visitors or aliens who arrive at the border without having established
ties to the national community? But these and several related theories
fail to account for the generally restrictive approaches taken by the
courts. Legomsky is led to consider other "external" factors, such as the
personal background and attitudes of the judges, which he describes as
"homogeneous" and "conservative," and the self-perceived role of the
courts in both the United Kingdom and the United States, with United
States courts perceiving their role to be somewhat more assertive.
22
The thesis of inexplicable judicial conservatism in Immigration and the
Judiciary can be usefully viewed in connection with recent developments
in refugee jurisprudence in both the United Kingdom and the United
States. The refugee cases, which are not treated in the book, provide a
useful test of Legomsky's thesis. The governmental interests are typical,
i.e. administrative, and the individual interests jeopardized by an errone-
ous decision and return are the weightiest possible-freedom or even life
itself.23 Moreover, the international law principles involved provide ad-
ditional sources of relief for refugees.24 Such cases, therefore, would be
expected to favor judicial intervention on behalf of the individuals and
pose the greatest dilemma for a judiciary predisposed to restriction.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the British
House of Lords, on the substantive standard for refugee protection 25 and
on judicial review of agency rules concerning the circumstances under
which aliens, including asylum applicants, may present claims for re-
lief,26 will be- examined to test Legomsky's thesis. The results of the ex-
amination are consistent with Legomsky's point, in that, in statutory
interpretation, a liberal trend is identified.
20. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C.).
21. Pp. 273-324.
22. Pp. 223-53.
23. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum
and Beyond, 44 U. PrTT. L. REV. 165, 189-90 (1983).
24. See infra notes 37, 40, 59-60 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 29-31 and 48-54 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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The first recent development concerns the standard of proof for asy-
lum applicants. On March 9, 1987, the United States Supreme Court, in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,27 decided
only the second case under the Refugee Act of 1980.28 The first case,
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic,29 held that for an alien
to be eligible for the immigration remedy of withholding of deporta-
tion,30 he or she must demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that
[he or she] would be subject to persecution" in the country to which
return was proposed.31 The Stevic Court deliberately left open the ques-
tion of the appropriate standard of proof in asylum cases. 32 In Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Court answered that question by holding that the more lib-
eral "well-founded fear" standard, rather than the "probability" stan-
dard articulated in Stevic, governed asylum.
33
The Court in Cardoza-Fonseca looked first, as it had in Stevic, to the
language and structure of the applicable statute.34 The Refugee Act es-
tablished a new statutory procedure for granting asylum to refugees who
are physically present in the United States. The statute provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective
of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General
determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section
1101(a)(42) of this title.
35
The term "refugee" here means:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to re-
turn to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion .... 36
27. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
28. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
29. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
31. 467 U.S. at 429-30.
32. Id.
33. 107 S. Ct. at 1222.
34. Id. at 1212-13; see Stevic, 467 U.S. at 421-24.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
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This definition is derived from the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Proto-
col relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded
in 1968.3
7
When the asylum provision was added to the immigration statute in
1980, the withholding of deportation provision was also amended. 38 The
Attorney General previously had had the discretion to grant withholding
of deportation to aliens. The statutory language was adjusted in 1980 to
remove this discretion and to make withholding mandatory. 39 Congress
took this action in recognition of the obligation the United States had
assumed when it acceded to Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, which
prohibits the return of refugees to situations that threaten life or free-
doma.4 The Court in Stevic found it significant that Congress in the Ref-
ugee Act had not incorporated the term "refugee" and the concomitant
"well-founded fear" standard into the withholding provision.41 It thus
held that the prior administrative "clear probability" standard for with-
holding deportation remained in force.42 That was not the case, how-
ever, with the asylum standard, which incorporates the "refugee"
definition, and the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca looked to a textual analysis:
To begin with, the language Congress used to describe the two standards
conveys very different meanings. The "would be threatened" language of
§ 243(h) [withholding] has no subjective component, but instead requires
the alien to establish by objective evidence that it is more likely than not
that he or she will be subject to persecution upon deportation. See Stevic,
supra. In contrast, the reference to "fear" in the § 208(a) [asylum] stan-
dard obviously makes the eligibility determination turn to some extent on
the subjective mental state of the alien.
43
Congress' act in simultaneously adding the asylum provision with a
new standard, and amending the withholding provision, presumably re-
taining the old standard, dictated the result in Cardoza-Fonseca: "The
37. The United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter 1967 Proto-
col]. It was ratified by the United States on October 4, 1968. 114 CONG. REC. 29,607 (1968).
The Protocol incorporated the pertinent aspects of the refugee definition in article 1 and arti-
cles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 19 U.S.T. 6225, 6261-64,
6264-76, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (quoting Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, 152-56, 156-75 (1951) [hereinafter 1951 Convention]).
38. See Stevic, 467 U.S. at 421 n.15; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
39. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1212.
40. 1951 Convention, supra note 37, at 176. Article 33(1) provides that "[n]o Contracting
State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
41. 467 U.S. at 422-24.
42. Id. at 430.
43. 107 S. Ct. at 1212-13 (footnotes omitted).
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contrast between the language used in the two standards, and the fact
that Congress used a new standard to define the term 'refugee,' certainly
indicate that Congress intended the two standards to differ."
44
The decision, however, contains much more than a bare textual analy-
sis. Unlike Stevic, the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca was more purposive, in
that it went beyond the plain language of the statute to examine whether
there is a "'clearly expressed legislative intention' contrary to that lan-
guage."' 45 The Court found that the language of the Refugee Act was
confirmed by pre-1980 experience under a predecessor to the asylum pro-
vision, the intent to conform the definition of "refugee" to that contained
in the 1967 Protocol, and the fact that Congress had specifically declined
to enact a version of the Act that would have rendered a refugee ineligi-
ble for asylum unless "his deportation or return would be prohibited" by
the withholding provision. 46
The liberal approach to statutory interpretation was then repeated in
the United Kingdom, which has also incorporated the Convention's
"well-founded fear of persecution" standard into its laws regarding polit-
ical asylum and the determination of refugee status.4 7 Notwithstanding
the narrow scope of judicial review of administrative decisions available
in the United Kingdom, a generous interpretation of the Convention's
definition of political refugees and the well-founded fear standard has
been adopted.
A very recent decision of the House of Lords is on point.48 The case
involved six Tamil asylum applicants who claimed to be refugees from
Sri Lanka. The Secretary of State for the Home Department refused the
claims and leave to apply for judicial review was granted. 49 The court of
first instance dismissed the applications, but the Court of Appeal re-
versed. 50 Citing the United States Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca,
the Court of Appeal held that:
"[W]ell-founded fear" is demonstrated by providing (a) actual fear and (b)
good reason for this fear, looking at the situation from the point of view of
one of reasonable courage .... Fear is clearly an entirely subjective state
44. Id. at 1213. See Helton, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic: Standards
of Proof in Refugee Cases Involving Political Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, 87 W.
VA. L. REV. 787 (1985).
45. 107 S. Ct. at 1213 n.12 (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
46. Id. at 1213-14.
47. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department exparte Sivakumaran, [1988] 1
All E.R. 193, slip op. at 2-3 (H.L. 1987).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1-2.
50. [1987] 3 W.L.R. 1047 (C.A.).
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experienced by the person who is afraid. The adjectival phrase "well-
founded" qualifies, but cannot transform, the subjective nature of the
emotion. 5 l
But the House of Lords found that the Court of Appeal had gone too
far in stating the principle. Lord Keith explained:
It is a reasonable inference that the question whether the fear of persecution
held by an applicant for refugee status is well-founded is... intended to be
objectively determined by reference to the circumstances at the time pre-
vailing in the country of the applicant's nationality. This inference is forti-
fied by reflection that the general purpose of the [Refugee] Convention is
surely to afford protection and fair treatment to those for whom neither is
available in their own country, and does not extend to the allaying of fears
not objectively justified, however reasonable those fears may appear from
the point of view of the individual in question.
5 2
In finding that the circumstances justifying the fear must be real, Lord
Keith also cited Cardoza-Fonseca with approval, stating:
It would... appear that Stevens J. was of opinion [sic] that it was appropri-
ate to weigh up upon the basis of an objective situation established by evi-
dence whether or not there was a reasonable chance or serious possibility of
persecution. There is no suggestion that the matter should be looked at
only from the point of view of the individual claiming to have well-founded
fear. 5 3
Notwithstanding the qualification, the decision is clearly in the liberal
vein.5
4
On reviewing issues of discretion, refugees have not fared nearly as
well. On March 1, 1988, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Abudu,55 the United States Supreme Court held that a reviewing court
can set aside the denial of an administrative motion to reopen a final
administrative order to apply for substantive relief from deportation or
exclusion only if it concludes there was an abuse of discretion. The
Court explained:
That is, in a given case the BIA may determine, either as a sufficient ground
for denying relief or as a necessary step toward granting relief, whether the
alien has produced previously unavailable, material evidence [8 C.F.R.
§ 3.2 (1987)], and, in asylum cases, whether the alien has reasonably
51. Id at 1052-53, quoted in Sivakumaran, slip op. at 3.
52. Sivakumaran, slip op. at 4.
53. Id at 6.
54. Such an outcome is particularly noteworthy given the proclivity of the courts in the
United Kingdom to interpret treaty obligations narrowly. See p. 80.
55. 108 S. Ct. 904 (1988).
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explained his or her failure to request asylum initially [8 C.F.R. § 208.11
(1987)].56
The Court in Abudu disfavored motions to reopen in deportation or ex-
clusion proceedings even when the reopening is sought, as in Abudu's
case, to assert a claim based on fear of persecution upon return to the
home country.
5 7
The Abudu Court's approach is restrictive and incompatible with the
unique situation of refugees and the purpose of the Refugee Act. Deci-
sions whether to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings to seek asy-
lum, if they are to be rational and not arbitrary, must take these factors
into account. Refugees frequently seek protection only after it becomes
clear that they have little hope of a safe, unmolested return to their
homelands. Often, because of their reluctance to sever ties with their
homelands and out of fear of reprisals to family and others, refugees ap-
ply for asylum as a last resort. The Court's decision in Abudu failed to
recognize this reality and takes an overly conservative approach.
Unfortunately, the Court's instructions regarding deference to agency
decisions went even further:
[A]lthough all adjudications by administrative agencies are to some degree
judicial and to some degree political... INS officials must exercise espe-
cially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign rela-
tions, and therefore the reasons for giving deference to agency decisions on
petitions for reopening or reconsideration in other administrative contexts
apply with even greater force in the INS context.58
This statement provides another chilling omen of an abdication of judi-
cial responsibility. No tenet is more fundamental to American refugee
law than the notion that individual asylum adjudications are to be free
from the influence of foreign relations. Congress intended individual ref-
ugee claims to be determined evenhandedly, without regard to political
ideology. When the United States became a party to the 1967 Protocol,
it agreed to apply the Protocol's definition of "refugee": anyone with a
"well-founded fear of being persecuted" based on "race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion." 59
This standard was meant to be nonideological, and the situation of each
56. Id. at 913.
57. Id.
58. Id at 914-15 (footnotes omitted).
59. 1967 Protocol, art. 1, § 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.NT.S. at 268;
1951 Convention, art. 1, § A(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152, 154.
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person was to be assessed on its own merits. 60 The Refugee Act of
198061 established neutral eligibility criteria in accordance with the inter-
national obligations of the United States. 62 By injecting notions of for-
eign relations into asylum cases, the Abudu decision invites the
continuation of an inappropriately restrictive approach in contravention
to international humanitarian principles.
63
The basic premise of Immigration and the Judiciary is unassailable-
the courts have not been very solicitous of the interests of aliens in immi-
gration cases. The courts decline to review whole categories of cases, and
frequently exercise review under unnecessarily restricted standards.
Even when review is full, as on questions of law, the results are generally
inimical to the interests of aliens. Such a conservative approach defies
logic or policy. As Legomsky suggests, courts may indeed be influenced
by external factors such as judges' personal attitudes. 64 Judges, after all,
are also citizens who may wish to pay homage to the sometimes arbitrary
prerogatives of sovereignty and national identity. Some support for this
proposition is provided in the rulings of the European Court, by judges
who, in owing allegiance to an international legal regime, are presumably
liberated from such nationalistic constraints. Legomsky characterizes
the European Court's decisions as "liberal" and favoring the freedom of
movement of migrant workers.65 This jurisprudence clearly reflects the
absence of conservatism inspired by concepts of sovereignty.
In any event, at least in the context of refugees, developments in inter-
national law might inspire greater solicitude from the courts. Those in
need of refugee protection may be able to invoke an evolving interna-
tional law of human rights in order to overcome the narrow approach so
frequently taken in the application of a nation's municipal immigration
law. While the results are currently mixed, the infusion of these human
rights principles into national jurisprudence might ultimately result in a
fundamental transformation of immigration law.
60. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees para. 43, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng. (1979).
61. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
62. See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 251 (1984).
63. See supra notes 37, 40, 59-60 and accompanying text.
64. Pp. 226-35.
65. Pp. 125-42, 132, 134.
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